(Continued from Third page.)

It may be said that a Protectorate will meet all the conditions, and that without the difficulties (which it is granted are many) or any disadvantage, we may reap all the advantages of union. This is not true as regards the commercial situation. It will give no such new vigor to the Islands as will react to our advantage or to theirs; and still less is it true from the military point of view. It would doubtless be difficult to fortify and defend so remote a coast; but let the necessity arise under our Protectorate that Great Britain should possess that harbor, and we must fortify and defend it as thoroughly as if it belonged to us altogether; and we must do it without the internal control and previous possession which alone would make it possible. Notice one point, moreover. Within a few months England, Germany, Spain, Japan, and possibly France, have each of them *seized* an island in the Pacific. Another and much more desirable island offers itself to us, and we hesitate to take it, and prefer—some of us—to keep it neutral. We seem to be the only nation in the world that prefers neighbors to citizens in important military points! We have learned nothing from the spectacle of Spain with Gibraltar to keep her gates, nor from our own sore spot on the Atlantic coast—Bermuda.

We do not always realize how constantly the policy of the Government has tended toward annexation, and how perpetual has been the desire on the part of the Islanders themselves for this as an ultimate result. It is a very new idea (probably born largely of unrestrained corruption) that makes these natives, to any considerable extent, object to the plan. No one can read the pamphlet recently issued by the State Department containing most of the State papers on the subject without realizing that it has been simply a question of time, from the beginning. We have put it off as long as we can—the time has come. In the full catalogue of State papers on the Sandwich Islands it is astonishing to find how many relate to annexation in one form or another. The point is seriously discussed in 1843, and in 1850 it takes definite shape. From that time it has never been out of the mind in our diplomacy. Webster, Rives, Calhoun, Marcy, Clayton, Evarts, Blaine—all our Secretaries discuss it with the various ministers, and all our Presidents consider it. Without considering in detail the extremely interesting facts of which even a summary is too long for such an article as this, we may sum up the results. In just fifty years, then, from 1843 to 1893, we find Tyler refusing a Protectorate over the Hawaiian islands on the ground of their too intimate relations with us; a proposition to cede them to England under Polk; a deed of session under Fillmore; an unratified treaty of annexation under Pierce; propositions for treaties under Lincoln and Johnson and Grant, all of whom were in favor of such action; favorable consideration of the matter under Garfield; another refusal of a Protectorate by Cleveland; further favorable consideration and a treaty by Harrison. It would seem to be somewhat unhistorical to call this *last* action hasty.

Two kinds of a protectorate are proposed, the first that of distinctively American responsibility without distinct American control is the plan first imagined by Secretary Webster, in 1843, which we have attempted to carry out ever since. It is a plan which to-day, in the altered condition of the Islands, and with the increased facility of communication, and in view of coming complications in the Pacific, seems to have little to recommend it. It is, moreover, no longer possible since neither power nor character inheres in the native government any longer. But another plan is now proposed—that of a joint protectorate, making the Sandwich Islands neutral and free. This is practically the same power which Webster and President Tyler refused in 1843, and when, in 1874, during Grant's Administration, on the occasion of the death of King Lunalilo, the British Commissioner to Hawaii proposed to join with the American Minister in protecting the Islands, the American finds the services of the British unnecessary, and is commended therefor. Still later, when in 1887 Sir Lionel West proposed, on behalf of his Government to President Cleveland, just this guaranty of neutrality and an open port which is now proposed on behalf of England, France and the United States, Secretary Bayard flatly refused on account of our prior and paramount rights there. It is this plan, also, which is now in operation in Samoa, even to the extent of a joint court—with what success all will remember! It is this plan, too, under which the Suez Canal exists, and the Suez Canal is in reality as much under *English* control as the Thames itself. It does not appear that a plan which has all the practical disadvantage of the past, which we have persistently refused for fifty years, and which, in actual operation in two widely differing instances, has proved a practical or political failure—it does not appear that such a plan has in it any great promise of success. Moreover, a vision arises of the Greater United States managed according to our Democratic forms, with a protectorate over the Sandwich Islands, Cuba and Bermuda, over Mexico and Hayti and Nova Scotia—possibly Canada! Perhaps it is a choice of evils between a protectorate and annexation. But certainly let us choose the least; let us control if we are to manage.

Most of all, a Protectorate in any shape fails to meet the political question—the crucial question—Can we expand? "Why not keep our hands off altogether?" it will be said. Are we not big enough now? Yes and no. We are too big already, much too big, if we cannot modify and arrange our methods. As a matter of fact Alaska

(Concluded on Sixth Page.)